I do what I want - You do what you're told

	English	when people are free to do as they please, they usually imitate each other
	Italian	quando la gente è libera di fare come gli pare, di solito imita gli altri
	Spanish	cuando la gente es libre de actuar según le plazca, suele imitar a los demás
	French	lorsque les personnes sont libres de faire comme il leur plaît, elles imitent généralement les autres
	German	wenn die Menschen frei sind, zu tun was sie wollen, dann ahmen sie normalerweise das nach, was die anderen tun
	Russian	когда людям разрешено делать всё, что можно, они обычно подражают друг другу
	Arabic	عندما يكونوا الناس أحرارا ليعملون كما يشاؤون، يقلّدون عادة بعضهم البعض
	Aragones	cuan a chen ye libre de autuar seguntes quiera, suele imitar a ros demás
	Basque	jendeek nahi duten bezala jarduteko askatasuna dutenean, besteak imitatu ohi dituzte
	Brazilian Portuguese	quando as pessoas são livres de fazer o que lhes apetece, normalmente imitam os outros
	Breton	pa vez libr an dud d'ober evel ma karont, peurliesañ e trevezont an eil egile
	Catanese	quannu i cristiani su´libbiri ri fari zoccu vonu ri solitu cópiunu all´àuttri
	Czech	když si lidé mohou dělat, co se jim zlíbí, obvykle napodobují ostatní
	Danish	når mennesker er fri for at gøre som de har lyst til, efterligner de som regel de andre
	Dutch	als mensen vrij zijn te doen wat ze willen, doen ze meestal de anderen na
	Dzoratâi	quand lè dzein sant libre de fére cein que lâo plié, ordinérameint, l'imitant lè z'autro
	Esperanto	kiam la homoj estas liberaj fari, kiel plaĉas al ili, ĝenerale ili imitas unu la alian
	Estonian	kui inimesel on vaba voli teha, mida ta tahab, siis matkib ta reeglina teisi
	Finnish	kun ihmiset saavat tehdä kuten haluavat, he tavallisesti matkivat toisiaan
	Furlan	cuant che la int jè libare di fâ ce cal vûl, di solit al imite chei altris
	Galician	cando a xente é libre para facer o que lles peta, normalmente, arremedan ós outros
	Griko Salentino	motte o gheno ene libero na kàmi cino pu teli, quasi panta ikanni kunda tos addhò
	Hebrew	כאשר יש לאנשים חופש פעולה, הם לרוב מחקים אחד את רעהו
	Hungarian	amikor az emberek azt tehetik, amit akarnak, rendszerint egymást utánozzák
	Judeo-Spanish	kuando la djente es libera de ovrar komo le plaze, imita jeneralmente a los otros
	Korean	사람들은 그들이 하곺은대로 할 수 있을 때, 일반적으로 서로를 모방한다
	Latin	cum homines liberi agendi ut velint sunt, plerumque inter se imitantur
	Latvian	kad cilvēki var darīt visu, ko vēlas, viņi parasti atdarina cits citu
	Leonese	cuandu la xente ye llibre pa facere lu que ye presta, normalmente imitan a outros
	Mudnés	quànd la gèint l'è lìbera èd fêr a sò môd èd sôlit la và adrê a chi êter
	Napulitano	quann''a ggente è libbera 'e fà comme le pare, ô ssoleto scupiazza a ll'ate
	Paduan	co ea zente xé libera de fare queo che ea voe, de soirto se limita a imitare i altri
	Papiamentu	ora hendenan ta liber pa hasi loke nan ke, nan ta kustumá imitá otro
	Polish	jeżeli ludzie mogą robić to na co mają ochotę, to z reguły naśladują siebie
	Portuguese	quando as pessoas são livres de fazer o que lhes apetece, normalmente imitam os outros
	Praiese	quannu la genti è libera di fà cumi li pari,di solitu imita l'ati
	Roman	quanno la gente è libbera de fa´ come je pare, in genere imita l´ antri
	Romanian	când oamenii sunt liberi să facă ce le place, de obicei se imită unii pe alții
	Serbian	када су људи слободни да чине оно што желе, они обично имитирају једни друге
	Slovak	keď ľudia môžu robiť, čo sa im chce, zvyčajen napodobňujú iných
	Traditional Chinese	當人們可以自由地去做自己喜歡的事情時，他們通常就會互相模仿
	Triestino	co' la gente xe libera de far come che ghe par, de solito i se va drio un col'altro
	Turkish	insanlar istedikleri gibi davranmakta özgür olduklarında genellikle birbirlerini taklit ederler
	Umbro-Sabino	quanno ra gente è libbera de fa ello que je pare allora scimmiotta j'atri
	Venetian	quando che łe persóne łe xe łìbare de far quel che łe vol, de sòłito łe se ìmita fra de łore
	Welsh	pan fo pobl yn rhydd i wneud fel y mynnont, fel arfer byddant yn dynwared ei gilydd
	Zeneize	quande e gente peuan fâ comme veuan, pe comun fan o verso a-i ätri

GLOSSARY

al-Aqsa Brigades al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, armed wing of Fatah

Executive Force Security force set up in 2006 by the then Hamas government

Fatah Main party of the PLO, formerly headed by the first PA President Yasser Arafat

Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

al-Mezan A Palestinian human rights organization

Mukhabarat General Intelligence

OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories

PA Palestinian Authority

PCHR Palestinian Centre for Human Rights

PICCR Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

Qassam Brigades ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, armed wing of Hamas

RPGs Rocket-propelled grenades

CHRONOLOGY

January 2006 Hamas wins PA elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, defeating Fatah party of President Mahmoud Abbas.

March 2006 Hamas forms a government led by Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh.
February 2007 Fatah and Hamas leaders meet in Saudi Arabia to negotiate an end to inter-factional fighting and agree to form a national unity government.
17 March 2007 Fatah and Hamas form a unity government led by Prime Minister Haniyeh.
March-May 2007 Sporadic inter-factional clashes and attacks continue between security forces and armed groups loyal to Fatah and Hamas.
May 2007 Fatah-Hamas inter-factional clashes escalate.
June 2007 Hamas forces and armed groups attack and take control (by 14 June) of all Fatah-controlled PA security installations and government buildings in the Gaza Strip. On 14 June President Abbas dismisses Prime Minister Haniyeh’s government, declares a state of emergency and establishes an emergency government based in the West Bank headed by outgoing Finance Minister, now Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Hamas refuses to recognize the emergency government and sets up a Hamas de-facto administration in the Gaza Strip.

1. INTRODUCTION

Unprecedented levels of political violence between Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip during the past year, which culminated in June 2007 when Hamas seized control of Palestinian Authority (PA) security institutions in the territory, took a heavy toll on the civilian population and compounded the devastating impact of decades of Israeli occupation and military campaigns, causing a further deterioration in living conditions and prompting greater international isolation.

In all, some 350 people were killed and more than 2,000 were injured in the first half of 2007 as a direct result of the inter-factional armed clashes and attacks in the Gaza Strip between rival security forces and armed militias loyal to PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party and to (the now deposed) Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh’s Hamas party. Many of the dead and injured were bystanders who had taken no part in the fighting; others were militants of one side or another, including many who were killed in cold blood.

Both Fatah and Hamas security forces and armed groups committed grave human-rights abuses and displayed a flagrant disregard for the safety of the civilian population. Rival security forces whose responsibility it was to uphold and enforce the law, and to protect the population, betrayed this responsibility and instead acted as partisans, in concert with armed groups that serve as their proxy militias, and themselves broke the law and committed gross abuses with complete impunity.

Both sides killed captured rivals and abducted scores of members of rival groups and held them hostage, to be exchanged for friends and relatives held by their rivals. Indiscriminate attacks and reckless gun battles in residential neighbourhoods left a beleaguered civilian population virtual prisoners in their own homes. Roadblocks set up by gunmen from both sides further endangered the safety of residents and impeded their movements.

Much of the fighting took place in, from and around residential buildings, endangering both residents and passers by. Hamas gunmen commandeered the roofs of tall buildings from which they launched attacks against PA security forces, while Fatah gunmen made similar use of buildings from which to attack Hamas positions. Gunmen fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other missiles at and from residential buildings in which civilians were present causing large-scale damage and starting fires that resulted in further destruction. They also mounted attacks in and around hospitals, directly targeting and launching attacks from hospital buildings, putting patients and staff in danger, impeding the work of medical staff and hindering access to healthcare for those in need. At times, they directly targeted patients in their hospital beds.

In its visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) in June/July, Amnesty International heard harrowing accounts from victims of both sides and from residents who were directly affected by the waves of armed clashes which took place in the Gaza Strip in June and previous months. Although accounts of gun battles and other attacks in which both gunmen and uninvolved bystanders were killed and injured are often contested, there is incontrovertible evidence that both sides acted with reckless disregard for the safety of local residents and committed grave human rights abuses.

The situation that has emerged since Hamas’ violent takeover in the Gaza Strip in June has further undermined the rule of law. President Abbas’ decision to suspend all operations of PA security forces and judicial institutions in the Gaza Strip created a legal and institutional vacuum which Hamas has filled by establishing an alternative security and law enforcement apparatus which lacks appropriately-trained personnel or adequate accountability mechanisms or safeguards. Hamas’ Executive Force and the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing), operating outside the legal framework, continue to target Fatah activists and other critics. They routinely use violence to break up demonstrations and other gatherings, carry out arbitrary arrests and frequently subject detainees to beatings, torture or other ill-treatment. Undertakings by deposed Prime Minister Haniyeh and other Hamas leaders to investigate such abuses, hold those responsible to account and prevent the abuses from recurring have been ineffective. If anything, abuses have increased.

In the West Bank, the emergency government appointed by President Abbas in June has done little to hold to account the Fatah gunmen who reacted to the Hamas attacks in Gaza by attacking and abducting Hamas supporters and burning down their houses and businesses as well as the offices of charities believed to be linked to Hamas. Even though attacks targeting Hamas members and supporters mostly ceased after a few days, Fatah’s armed wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (al-Aqsa Brigades), continue to operate outside the law and to attack and intimidate Hamas supporters with impunity. Hundreds of known or presumed Hamas supporters and other Fatah critics have been arrested by PA security forces, and violations of arrest and detention procedures have been frequent. The space for freedom of speech and non-violent political activities in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip has shrunk significantly, both due to harassment and intimidation by militias acting outside the legal framework, and as a result of direct measures taken by the PA to silence their opponents.

Amnesty International is greatly concerned about the conduct of the PA security forces and Fatah-controlled armed groups and that of Hamas-controlled forces and armed groups, in particular at:

- reckless use of force by all parties in the armed clashes, which resulted in the killing and wounding of unarmed bystanders, including children;
- deliberate killings of political opponents and of hostages, and of armed men who had been captured or incapacitated;
- the use by all parties to the armed clashes of hospitals, schools and civilian residential buildings from which to carry out attacks against their opponents, including attacks carried out against and within such buildings, including hospitals;
- abductions, hostage-taking and arbitrary detention;
- torture and other ill-treatment of detainees and hostages;
- denial of detainees’ access to legal counsel;
- use of excessive, unnecessary and even deadly force against peaceful demonstrators;
- systematic impunity for members of the security forces and armed groups responsible for these grave human rights abuses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In the Gaza Strip Amnesty International is concerned at:

- political killings and the re-emergence of a situation of lawlessness;
- the targeting of Fatah supporters and other political opponents by the Executive Force and the Qassam Brigades in a politically-motivated campaign of arbitrary detentions and abductions;
- torture and other ill-treatment of detainees and hostages;
- arbitrary detention of detainees in locations not authorized by law for this purpose, where detainees are at risk;
- the establishment by the Hamas de-facto administration of agencies and mechanisms to enforce the law and administer justice, but which lack the requisite independence, skills and accountability to discharge this role and to ensure that the rule of law is respected for both victims and accused, that human-rights abuses are not committed, that victims have access to effective mechanisms to obtain redress, and that those accused of crimes are afforded due process;
- the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of crimes and the lack of political will on the part of the Hamas de-facto administration to hold such perpetrators to account and to respect fundamental human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association.

In the West Bank Amnesty International is concerned at:

- the targeting of Hamas supporters by PA security forces in a politically-motivated campaign of arbitrary detentions and intimidation;
- torture and other ill-treatment of detainees held arbitrarily by the PA security forces;
- systematic breaches of the procedures laid down by Palestinian law relating to arrest, detention and prosecution of suspects; arrests are carried out by security forces who have no authority under the law to do so and detainees are held arbitrarily in security-force facilities that are not designated by law for such purpose;
- the failure of the security forces to bring detainees before prosecutors and judges within the legally-stipulated period, and the continued arbitrary detention of detainees whose release has been ordered by a judge;
- attacks by members of al-Aqsa Brigades against Hamas supporters and others;
- the impunity enjoyed by members of the security forces and al-Aqsa Brigades and the lack of political will on the part of the PA administration to hold such perpetrators to account; to respect fundamental human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association; and to afford due process and redress to the victims.

2. BACKGROUND

In January 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, defeating the Fatah party of President Mahmoud Abbas which had been in power continuously since the establishment of the PA in 1994. Hamas formed a government in March 2006, led by Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh.

Over the following months, political tensions between the rival parties and their supporters developed into armed confrontations in which security forces and militia-type armed groups loyal to Fatah were pitted against security forces and similar militia-type armed groups loyal to Hamas. These clashes became increasingly frequent and intensified as repeated attempts to reach a compromise and form a Fatah-Hamas coalition government failed, and a new wave of inter-factional fighting broke out after President Abbas announced in December 2006 that he intended to call new presidential and parliamentary elections in the PA.

In February 2007, leaders of the two parties met in Mecca, under the auspices of King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia, and reached what became known as the "Mecca Agreement".(1) Essentially, this was a pledge to end the inter-factional fighting and form a national unity government: crucially, the agreement failed to spell out the concrete measures the two sides would take to achieve the stated goal.

The unity government was then established on 17 March 2007. Prime Minister Haniyeh remained in place as its head but it included ministers from Fatah and Hamas, as well as independents and representatives of small parties. It failed to bring any improvement, however, and the continuing involvement of Hamas led the international community largely to maintain its boycott and the sanctions it had imposed on the Hamas-led government following its election in 2006, and to continue to limit its contacts and funding to the PA to President Abbas and non-Hamas ministers. Hamas resented its continuing international isolation but persisted in its refusal to comply with the conditions laid down by the Quartet (USA, European Union, Russia and the UN), namely that it should recognize the State of Israel, renounce violence in its struggle against Israeli occupation and accept agreements previously signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with Israel.

Tensions continued to mount particularly in the Gaza Strip, where the Hamas leadership remained confined and became increasingly resentful that its ministers and institutions continued to be isolated by the international boycott and sanctions while the mostly West Bank-based Fatah leadership enjoyed international recognition and continued to receive foreign financial support.

As the level of distrust between Fatah and Hamas grew, the viability of the new unity government was increasingly called into question and both sides accused the other of seeking to undermine it. At the same time, the security situation deteriorated, marked by abductions and attacks against foreigners, and Hamas alleged that certain individuals within Fatah were deliberately fomenting chaos in the Gaza Strip in order to force the collapse of the unity government.

In May 2007, armed clashes between the two sides resumed with renewed intensity. A series of ceasefires were agreed by the Fatah and Hamas leadership, but these collapsed within days or even hours. Each time, the ensuing casualties and damage engendered further resentment and mistrust between the two sides, so exacerbating the divisions between them and increasing the likelihood of further violent clashes. As lawlessness spread, the distinctions between politically-motivated attacks and score-settling by sub-groups on each side, attacks by other political groups and long-standing family feuds became increasingly blurred. In May, unity government Interior Minister Talab al-Qawasmi resigned amid mounting tension between Fatah and Hamas and actions by both sides which undermined his position.(2) Then, after the Israeli government authorized the entry into the Gaza Strip from Egypt of hundreds of Fatah fighters newly trained under a US-funded programme and Hamas gunmen ambushed a convoy which they alleged was carrying weapons newly delivered to Fatah, both sides accused the other of plotting a coup. Widespread and intensive armed clashes ensued.

Hamas forces and armed groups attacked and took over all the PA security forces positions and other institutions, and effectively took control of internal affairs in the Gaza Strip. In response, on 14 June, President Abbas dismissed Prime Minister Haniyeh’s unity government, declared a state of emergency and appointed outgoing Finance Minister Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister of a new emergency government based in the West Bank. The emergency government was appointed on 17 June for a 30-day period, as stipulated by the Palestinian Basic Law,(3) but has remained in place to date, without the approval of the Palestinian Legislative Council (parliament). (4) This violates the Basic Law, which stipulates: "The state of emergency may be extended for another period of thirty (30) days if a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council vote in favor of the extension."(5)

Hamas has refused to recognize the West Bank-based emergency government, insisting that the deposed Prime Minister Haniyeh is the legitimate, democratically-elected Prime Minister and calling for a resumption of dialogue with Fatah. President Abbas, Fatah and the emergency government insist that Hamas relinquish control of all PA security installations and other institutions in the Gaza Strip before any political dialogue can be considered. Other political parties represented in the Palestinian Parliament have abstained from participating in the emergency government, except for the Third Way party of Prime Minister Fayyad, but some have backed President Abbas’ call for a return to the status quo ante in the Gaza Strip.

3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Palestinian and international human rights law

During a few brief periods, up to 14 June 2007, when the violence between Fatah and Hamas security forces and armed groups in the Gaza Strip reached the requisite scale and intensity, the relevant rules of international humanitarian law (6) on the conduct of hostilities also applied, alongside human rights standards.

International humanitarian law sets out standards of humane conduct applicable to all parties in armed conflicts, including armed groups. In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the foremost authority on international humanitarian law, "whenever armed force is used the choice of means and methods is not unlimited." This basic rule is explicitly reflected in a number of international humanitarian law treaties. Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol 2 are the instruments most directly relevant to non-international armed conflict. These treaties increasingly are supplemented by customary international law. The authoritative ICRC study of customary international humanitarian law has determined that many of the rules of international humanitarian law that were codified for international conflict now apply to non-international conflicts as well. These customary rules(7) include the prohibition of direct attacks on civilians; the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks -- attacks which fail to take necessary precautions to distinguish between civilians and fighters; and the prohibition of disproportionate attacks – attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. And it is long established that willful killings and torture; the taking of hostages, and attacks against those who are hors de combat are prohibited by international humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict.(8)

International criminal law provides that individuals who perpetrate serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and should be brought to justice. Serious violations of international humanitarian law are war crimes.

The right to life, liberty and security of person is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR - Article 3).

Although not fully in line with internationally recognized human rights standards, Palestinian laws contain numerous provisions, which – if implemented – would provide important safeguards for detainees against arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment.

Article 13 of the Basic Law categorically prohibits the use of torture or duress against detainees and stipulates that statements or confessions obtained as a result of such abuses are considered null and void.

The obligation not to subject people to torture or other ill-treatment is a rule of customary international law and the prohibition of torture is absolute. The absolute prohibition has been codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as several human rights treaties, notably the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, and in non-treaty human rights standards. The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (hereafter The Body of Principles)(9) stipulates in Principle 6: "No person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.(10) No circumstance whatever may be invoked as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

Torture and other ill-treatment is also prohibited by international humanitarian law, as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime.

Article 9 of the UDHR prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention. The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty is also considered a norm of customary international law.(11) This prohibition is also enshrined in the Body of Principles. Principle 2 of the Body of Principles states: "Arrest, detention or imprisonment shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose."

Principle 36 (2) states: "The arrest or detention of such a person pending investigation and trial shall be carried out only for the purposes of the administration of justice on grounds and under conditions and procedures specified by law. The imposition of restrictions upon such a person which are not strictly required for the purpose of the detention or to prevent hindrance to the process of investigation or the administration of justice, or for the maintenance of security and good order in the place of detention, shall be forbidden."

Furthermore, international standards require that all detentions be ordered by and subject to challenge before and supervision by an independent judicial authority. Principle 4 of the Body of Principles states:

"Any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting the human rights of a person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be ordered by, or be subject to the effective control of, a judicial or other authority."

Principle 11 states: "A person shall not be kept in detention without being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or other authority. A detained person shall have the right to defend himself or to be assisted by counsel as prescribed by law."

The same Principle also requires that a detained person and his counsel "receive prompt and full communication of any order of detention, together with the reasons therefore" and that "a judicial or other authority shall be empowered to review as appropriate the continuance of detention." The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention may not be suspended, even during times of emergency.(12)

Similar provisions are contained in Palestinian law: Article 11 of the Basic Law makes it unlawful to arrest and imprison any person except by judicial order in accordance with the provisions of the law, and requires that detainees are held only in places authorized by the laws relating to the organization of prisons. Article 29 of the Penal Procedures Law states: "No person may be arrested or imprisoned except by order of the competent authority as designated by law. He must be treated in a manner that will preserve his dignity and may not be physically or morally harmed."

Further, both international standards(13) and Palestinian law prohibit holding people in unofficial places of detention. Article 68 of the Penal Procedures Law states: "No person may be detained or confined except in a correctional and rehabilitation centre [a prison] and in the places of detention designated by law." The failure to abide by the above-mentioned Palestinian law and/or these international standards renders a detention or arrest arbitrary under international human rights standards.

The Body of Principles states that the detaining authorities "shall exercise only the powers granted to them under the law and the exercise of these powers shall be subject to recourse to a judicial or other authority" (Principle 9), that detentions must be promptly reviewed by a judicial or other authority (Principle 11) and that detainees must be given prompt access to their families and legal counsel (Principle 15).

Similar provisions are contained in the Palestinian Penal Procedures Law, according to which the detention of any individual prior to their being charged with an offence must be reviewed within 24 hours by a prosecutor (Article 34), who may extend the detention for an additional 48 hours. After 72 hours of detention, the case must be reviewed by a judge (Article 51), who may extend the pre-charge detention by 15 days (Articles 62 and 63), renewable by a judge every 15 days to a maximum of 45 days.(14) The law also grants detainees prompt and unhindered access to legal counsel (Article 46). Further, Article 12 of the Basic Law requires that detainees be charged and brought to trial without delay.

Palestinian justice system

The legal system in the areas of the OPT under PA jurisdiction comprises a body of laws and decrees which include those remaining from previous centuries when the area was ruled by other powers – Ottoman, British, Jordanian (in the West Bank), Egyptian (in the Gaza Strip) and Israeli – and legislation introduced since 1994, notably decrees issued by former President Yasser ‘Arafat and current President Mahmoud ‘Abbas, and laws passed by the Palestinian parliament, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The first elections to the PLC, which comprises 132 members, were held in 1996. Laws passed by the PLC come into force once ratified by the PA President. The PLO Revolutionary Code of 1979 (developed by PLO structures in exile prior to the establishment of the PA) is also still in force and is the basis of the military justice system. The Basic Law of 2003, amended in 2005, acts as a form of constitution pending the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The court system consists of Sulh (Conciliation/Magistrate) courts, which hear cases of misdemeanors; Bidaya (First Instance) courts, which hear cases of more serious crimes and appeals against judgments handed down by Sulh courts; Appeal Courts, which hear appeals against judgments of the First Instance Court; and the High Court, which provides the highest level of appeal and hears petitions for cassation challenging procedural breaches. A Supreme Criminal Court was set up in 2006 to try crimes including murder, abduction, rape, so-called honour crimes and attacks on public finance and national security. Military Courts hear cases involving members of the security forces and apply the 1979 PLO Revolutionary Code. In 2006 a law was passed establishing a High Constitutional Court, but it has not yet been set up in practice.(15) Civil courts hear civil cases and Shari’a (religious) courts hear cases under family and personal status law (such as marriage and divorce). The State Security Courts were abolished by the Minister of Justice in 2003.(16)

The Attorney General and prosecutors investigate and prosecute crimes, oversee the legality of detentions and investigate complaints by detainees. The Attorney General and the judges are nominated by the Higher Judicial Council, which is headed by the President of the High Court, but appointed by the PA President.

A traditional ‘Urf (customary) system of conciliation and mediation by clan/tribal leaders and other respected figures in the community has continued to exist and to function in parallel to the court system; for many Palestinians, this remains the preferred means through which to resolve family/clan feuds and other disputes, ranging from issues affecting family "honour" to murder, injury or financial issues. This mediation system has also been used as a basis for addressing clashes between political factions, including brokering cease-fires, negotiating safe passage for militants/leaders in danger, and resolving other cases of disputes between Fatah and Hamas which arose in the course of the bloody clashes which occurred in the Gaza Strip in the first half of 2007.(17)

Institutional and judicial vacuum in the Gaza Strip

After Hamas took control of the PA security installations in the Gaza Strip in June, President Abbas instructed the police and security forces not to report for duty in Gaza, on penalty of losing their salaries. On 10 July the Attorney General, who is responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal cases,(18) confirmed to Amnesty International that his office had not undertaken any activity in the Gaza Strip since mid-June.(19)

On 2 July the Chief Justice and President of the Higher Judicial Council and of the Supreme Court issued the following instructions to the presidents of the bidaya and sulh courts:

"Due to the current situation in the Gaza Strip and due to the lack of a police force to assist and safeguard the implementation of judicial decisions, we request all judges and workers in the directorates responsible for implementing judicial decisions to suspend all decisions requiring police assistance for their implementations, in order to protect the independence and dignity of the judiciary and protect it from any interference that would threaten its independence".(20)

Only the Sharia courts continued to function, but rulings which required action by the police could not be implemented due to the absence of a police force following President Abbas’ order to the police to stand down.

This exacerbated what was already a lawless situation. For several years, virtually none of those responsible for political killings and abductions – mostly carried out by armed groups linked to Fatah, and more recently also by Hamas’ armed wing and other groups, have been brought to justice. With security forces and successive attorney generals and prosecutors mostly unable or unwilling to prosecute political cases, arrests and prosecutions tended to be limited to common-law cases, while crimes committed in the context of political and intra-clan/families clashes tended to be tackled through informal mediation efforts between the concerned parties conducted by respected community leaders, or else they were simply left unaddressed. This signal failure on the part of the PA, its security forces and the judiciary to investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of human rights abuses, contributed to a large extent to the lawlessness which became increasingly entrenched in the Gaza Strip, as well as in the West Bank.(21)

These long-standing failures and short-comings underscored the need for urgent and far-reaching reforms – such as the appointment of non-partisan police and other officials, better training, the establishment of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms that could help stamp out abuses by the security forces, and measures to empower the judiciary and enhance its independence. Instead, President Abbas’ decision to freeze the activities of the police and the judiciary in the Gaza Strip resulted in an institutional and judicial vacuum that left the 1.5 million inhabitants of the Gaza Strip effectively without any law enforcement institution to which they could turn.(22) It also opened the way for the Hamas de-facto administration to put in place alternative systems to fill this judicial and policing vacuum, which, however, lack adequate independence, impartiality, training, oversight and public accountability.

Prior to June 2007, the Gaza Strip’s residents faced great difficulties in obtaining justice or redress from the malfunctioning judicial institutions and mechanisms of the PA. Since the Hamas takeover, however, the situation has deteriorated further. Gazans now have no chance at all to obtain justice or redress through the law because the official institutions are absent. In the past, while the police and the courts of the PA rarely took action against security forces and armed militias responsible for "political" crimes such as killings and abductions, they did act in other types of cases, such as common law crimes, as well as to enforce the rulings of civil and religious courts.

Since June, the absence of PA institutions has left the residents of the Gaza Strip with no choice other than to take the law into their own hands or to turn to the politically-partisan security and law enforcement apparatus set up by Hamas. Ultimately, the vacuum encouraged Hamas to develop parallel systems and to take ad hoc measures outside the judicial and institutional framework.

Since July members of the security forces in the Gaza Strip have been receiving their salaries in full from the West Bank-based PA emergency government after many months, during which their salaries were paid only partly or not at all. However, the payment of salaries is conditional on the personnel not reporting for duty – in effect, they are paid not to work. Those who continued to work under the Hamas de-facto administration had their salaries stopped.(23) Thus, whereas for more than a year the security forces were expected to carry out their duties without receiving their salaries, they are now required not to work as a condition for receiving their salaries.

Proliferation of parallel systems outside the legal framework in the Gaza Strip

Hamas filled the void by deploying the Executive Force throughout the Gaza Strip. The rank and file members of this force are drawn from Hamas’ Qassam Brigades (see Chapter 4), who are trained to carry out attacks against Israeli targets and to fight Israeli forces during their incursions into the Gaza Strip - not to act as law enforcement officers. As was the case in the past, when political and personal loyalties – rather than skills and competence – were often the determining factor in the recruitment of members of the Fatah-dominated PA security forces and judicial apparatus, the Hamas de-facto administration has been recruiting Hamas supporters into its forces and other public institutions.

The Qassam Brigades have participated in attacks against demonstrators alongside the Executive Force and have also abducted people independently of the Executive Force and run two detention centers in the Gaza Strip. Neither the Qassam Brigades nor the Executive Force have any legal authority to arrest and detain people; the Qassam Brigades is an armed group which exists outside the framework of the law and the Executive Force is a force which is not authorized by law to carry out arrests and detain people. Such detentions are arbitrary, and violate both Palestinian law and international standards.

Since July 2007, Hamas has announced a series of new bodies or mechanisms to replace the PA security forces and judicial institutions that have refused to operate under or alongside the Hamas de-facto administration. According to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights (PICCR – the national human rights body),(24) the Executive Force set up a committee on 9 July to deal with the cases of detainees who had been held in Gaza central prison in al-Saraya security compound prior to the Hamas takeover of the compound.(25)

On 21 July the Executive Force spokesman announced that Hamas had formed a legal committee to address the lack of functioning judicial institutions in the Gaza Strip and stated that this committee replaces the PA prosecution service "and prevents it from interfering in cases of the Palestinian public".(26) However, it was not until 16 August that the Executive Force took over the offices of the PA Attorney General in Gaza City. Shortly afterwards, the General Director for Legal Affairs in the Justice Ministry of the Hamas de-facto administration announced that it had appointed eight prosecutors and 20 assistant prosecutors to replace those who had stopped working in mid-June.(27)

On 16 August the Executive Force arrested the Attorney General, who had been in the West Bank since the beginning of the crisis and had recently returned to Gaza. In a testimony to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), he said he had been taken from his office and beaten while being taken to the central prison, where he was told to sign an undertaking not to exercise any prosecution-related duties, travel to the West Bank or make statements to the media, and to stop "incitement" against the Hamas administration. He refused to sign the statement but was released after a short time. The Executive Force spokesman informed PCHR that the Attorney General had been detained for one hour on suspicion of smuggling legal files on cases of corruption and murder, an allegation which the Attorney General denied. Executive Force members also body-searched the Attorney General’s assistants, erased pictures from their mobile telephones and threatened them at gunpoint. A lawyer with the Palestinian human rights organization al-Mezan was likewise briefly detained by the Executive Force when he attempted to photograph Executive Force members surrounding the Attorney General’s office. He was also taken to al-Saraya security compound and held there for an hour before being released

The head of the Executive Force, Jamal Jarrah, announced on 18 August that a new rapid response force was being formed and would be deployed imminently to deal with "collaborators" and with security issues requiring rapid intervention, such as drug smuggling. On 27 August, the Secretary General of the Hamas de-facto administration, Muhammad Awad, announced the creation of three new Palestinian police forces – an internal security force, a beach force and a female force.

On 4 September the Hamas de-facto administration announced the establishment of the Supreme Justice Council, which is to be responsible for appointing judges, in co-operation with the Justice Department. This Council is intended to replace the Higher Judicial Council, which nominates the Attorney General and judges, for appointment by the PA President, and trains the judges. Such moves are inconsistent with the principle of the independence of the judiciary and are in breach of numerous Palestinian laws – notably the Judicial Authority Law.(28)

Amnesty International is concerned that the bodies and mechanisms set up by the Hamas de-facto administration to carry out law enforcement and the administration of justice lack the necessary skills, independence, oversight and accountability to ensure that the rule of law is respected for both victims and accused; that human rights abuses are not committed; that victims have access to effective mechanisms to obtain redress; and that accused persons are afforded due process. To the contrary, it appears clear that perpetrators of human rights abuses continue to enjoy impunity, and that the Hamas de-facto administration lacks the political will to hold perpetrators of crimes to account, especially Hamas members, and to respect fundamental human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association. Essentially, the Hamas de-facto administration in the Gaza Strip is fast replicating and, indeed, exceeding many of the abuses and shortcomings for which it formerly denounced, on good grounds, the Fatah-dominated PA institutions, notably disregard of human rights by security forces and lack of political will to enforce the rule of law, leading to widespread lawlessness.

4. SECURITY FORCES AND ARMED GROUPS – BLURRED LINES

Security forces

Some 10 different security forces were set up by the PA in the second half of the 1990s, including the Preventive Security Service, Force 17, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence and Civil Police, comprising more than 30,000 members in all. For years, torture by PA security forces, notably the Preventive Security, was common against political detainees and detainees accused of "collaboration" with Israeli intelligence services.(29) Each security force ran its own detention centres, outside the legal framework, and in some cases detainees were held for years without trial or any effective means of remedy or redress.(30)

In 2005 President Abbas consolidated the security forces into three branches: National Security, Internal Security and General Intelligence, each comprising several forces.(31) General Intelligence includes Military Intelligence and the Military Police and is under the direct control of the PA President, as is the Presidential Guard/Force 17.(32) National Security is defined as "a regular military body"(33) and includes several forces. Internal Security includes the Preventive Security, the Police and the Civil Defense. National Security and Internal Security are under the jurisdiction of the Ministers of National Security and the Interior respectively, but the heads of the two forces are appointed by the PA President.(34)

After Hamas won the legislative elections and established a government in early 2006, it was not able to gain any measure of control over the security forces, some of which, notably the Presidential Guard/Force 17 and the Preventive Security, openly challenged the authority of the new government and carried out assassinations and other attacks against Hamas members.

The Executive Force was set up in April-May 2006 by the then Interior Minister in the Hamas government, who maintained that with no control over existing PA security forces, which remained essentially Fatah structures, the government had no law enforcement mechanism under its command and could not fulfil its duty and tackle the growing lawlessness and frequent abductions. The Executive Force is composed of members of the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Qassam Brigades) and Hamas supporters, and its leadership includes Major-General Tawfik Jaber, a former police chief under a Fatah government.

President Abbas objected to the creation of the Executive Force and called for it to be disbanded, but for more than a year he took no measures to force the then Hamas government to comply with this instruction.(35) Meanwhile the Hamas government made no efforts to have the parliament, in which it held a majority, to introduce legislation to establish formally the Executive Force and to regulate its operation.(36) The Executive Force, therefore, continues to operate outside the framework of the law.

According to reports, there were negotiations between Fatah and Hamas about possibly merging the Executive Force with existing PA security forces, but no agreement to do this was ever reached. Assassinations, abductions and intermittent armed clashes between rival Fatah and Hamas gunmen became increasingly frequent, with Fatah’s al-Aqsa Brigades and Hamas’ Qassam Brigades acting as auxiliary militias to certain PA security forces and to the Executive Force.

Only after Hamas’ Executive Force and the Qassam Brigades seized control of the PA security installations and other institutions in the Gaza Strip, did President Abbas issue a Presidential Decree outlawing the Executive Force.(37)

Armed groups

Most Palestinian political factions have an armed wing or armed groups affiliated to them.(38) However, the inter-factional armed clashes and attacks have been almost exclusively between the armed wing of Fatah, the al-Aqsa Brigades, and the armed wing of Hamas, the Qassam Brigades, which are also the two largest armed groups.

The al-Aqsa Brigades were created by Fatah activists, including members of the PA security forces, notably Force 17 and the Preventive Security,(39) in late 2000/early 2001, shortly after the outbreak of the intifada (the Palestinian uprising against Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip).(40) They first became known in Nablus, which has remained one of their main strongholds in the West Bank, and later became established in other towns, notably Jenin and Ramallah, as well as in the Gaza Strip. Their stated aim is armed resistance to Israeli occupation, including through the use of suicide bombings and other attacks against Israelis, including Israeli civilians, in Israel and in the OPT. However, in recent years, notably since 2004-05, they have been increasingly responsible for abductions of fellow Palestinians and foreign nationals mostly with the aim of extracting concessions from the PA – such as obtaining jobs, securing the release of friends and relatives detained by the PA for criminal activities, or to register their disagreement with positions taken by the PA leadership in their negotiations with Israel. The al-Aqsa Brigades have also been responsible for the vast majority of killings of fellow Palestinians accused of "collaboration" with Israeli intelligence services and have also abducted and tortured people to force them to pay ransoms. The al-Aqsa Brigades have consistently been afforded impunity for human rights abuses – whether against Palestinians, foreign nationals or Israeli civilians.

Although Fatah and the PA have never formally recognized the al-Aqsa Brigades as the armed wing of Fatah, the Brigades have consistently identified themselves as Fatah’s armed wing and have never been disavowed – either by the current or former PA President, or by the Fatah leadership. On the contrary, PA Fatah leaders have often granted concessions and recognition to the al-Aqsa Brigades. For example, during his 2005 presidential election campaign, President Abbas was photographed being carried on the shoulders of Zakaria Zubeidi, the al-Aqsa Brigades leader in Jenin.(41) Shortly after his election, President Abbas ordered the integration of al-Aqsa Brigades’ members into the PA security forces, where they would obtain official status and be paid by the PA.(42) On 12 July 2007, President Abbas issued a Presidential Decree granting the Jerusalem Medal to Samih al Madhoun, a colonel in the Presidential Guard/Force 17 and leader of al-Aqsa Brigades in the Gaza Strip, who was brutally killed in June 2007 by Hamas gunmen, a day after he had boasted in a radio interview about burning 20 houses of Hamas supporters.(43)

An unspecified number of al-Aqsa Brigades members have been integrated into the PA security forces over the years, notably into the Presidential Guard/Force 17; others have become members of the Brigades while already serving in the PA security forces. The ambiguous situation took on an added complexity from 2004 onwards, with the emergence of splinter groups within the ranks of the Brigades and their involvement in inter-factional fighting, first within Fatah itself and later against Hamas. Attacks by the al-Aqsa Brigades against Hamas members increased after Hamas gained control of several municipalities in the first Palestinian municipal elections in 2005 and prior to the January 2006 legislative elections,(44) and escalated further after Hamas’ victory in those legislative elections.

The Qassam Brigades were established in the early 1990s,(45) reportedly under the leadership of Yahia Ayash, who was later assassinated by the Israeli army. Their stated aim is armed resistance to Israeli occupation, including through the use of suicide bombings and other attacks against Israelis, including Israeli civilians, in Israel and in the OPT. However, in recent years, notably since 2005, they have increasingly been involved in armed clashes with and attacks against Fatah members, notably in the Gaza Strip. They have also been responsible for some killings of fellow Palestinians accused of "collaboration" with Israeli intelligence services.

Unlike the members of the al-Aqsa Brigades, members of the Qassam Brigades and of Hamas have been periodically targeted by the PA and its security forces – notably in the mid- to late-1990s. In this period, hundreds of Qassam Brigades and Hamas supporters were arrested by the PA; many were tortured or otherwise ill-treated and imprisoned after unfair trials or held for prolonged periods without charge or trial. These detentions appeared to be motivated essentially by political considerations - intended to stifle dissent against the PA and also to respond to Israeli and international pressure on the PA to act against armed groups - rather than by a genuine desire to bring perpetrators of serious crimes to justice. From the beginning of the intifada in late 2000 until the Hamas takeover in Gaza in mid-June 2007, however, the PA generally failed to take action against the al-Aqsa Brigades, the Qassam Brigades or any other armed groups that carried out attacks against Israeli civilians, although such attacks against civilians constituted gross breaches of international law.

Proliferation of unlicensed weapons – a root cause of lawlessness

The unchecked proliferation and misuse of firearms and explosives has contributed greatly to the growing lawlessness and insecurity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and has had a disastrous impact on the lives of the civilian population. Hundreds of Palestinians, including children, have been killed by other Palestinians using firearms and explosives, either deliberately or by accident, in recent years.

The armed clashes in the Gaza Strip and the attacks in the West Bank were facilitated by the ready availability of firearms and explosives, which armed groups claim to use only in the context of armed resistance to the Israeli occupation, but which have been used with increasing frequency against other Palestinians, notably by Fatah’s and Hamas’ armed groups. Over the years, the growing lawlessness and the inaction of the PA security forces in the face of such violence has led many Palestinians not linked to armed groups to acquire weapons for their own protection. Such proliferation of firearms has in turn fuelled violence within Palestinian society and aggravated the consequences of confrontations, with minor disputes between neighbours often escalating into prolonged gun battles that endanger the lives of residents of entire neighbourhoods.

The Firearms and Ammunition Law (2) of 1998 requires that no person may be in possession of a firearm unless they have obtained authorization from the Ministry of the Interior (Articles 2 and 3); that no one aged under 21 may possess or carry firearms (Article 5.a); that no one may own more than one firearm (Article 11); that firearms may not be carried in public areas, at conference, meetings, ceremonies or at wedding parties; and that it is absolutely prohibited to show off firearms (Article 14).

In practice, this law has rarely been applied. Adults and even children routinely carry and use unauthorized firearms in public places, including hospitals and schools. Busy streets in densely populated residential areas have frequently been the scene of gun battles between armed groups, rival security forces or feuding families, and armed individuals and members of the security forces frequently fire live ammunition in crowded public areas in celebration or protest, or simply to display their weapons. Such proliferation of weapons is unjustified and presents a real and continuing threat to the human rights of many Palestinians.

5. ABUSES IN THE GAZA STRIP

Unlawful killings and abductions

Both during and after the clashes that ended with Hamas’ de-facto takeover in the Gaza Strip, Hamas gunmen have hunted down members of the PA’s security forces and of the al-Aqsa Brigades, which they accused of being part of a group which had ordered and carried out assassinations of Hamas members.(46) High-ranking members of this target group who were captured by members of the Executive Force and Qassam Brigades were killed, while less prominent members or helpers were often shot in the legs in a deliberate policy to exact revenge and intimidate others.

Testimony of F.H., a mechanic working with the Presidential Guard/Force 17:

"On Sunday 10 June in the late morning, at about 10.30-11am, I and my colleague, Mohammed Swerki, who worked as a cook, were sent to deliver food to our colleagues who were in the Bacri Tower [a tall residential building in Gaza City]. However, we went to the wrong building by mistake; we went to the nearby Ghifari tower, where there was a Hamas group. When they opened the door downstairs we told them we were from Force 17 and they took us in and tied our hands and blindfolded us and took us upstairs; I don’t know if it was the top floor or one below. I don’t know if they were Qassam Brigades or Executive Force; they were dressed in black and masked. They asked me for names and telephone numbers of officers in Force 17 and which weapons they had and I said I didn’t know; I am a mechanic and my job was to repair cars and Mohammed was a cook; we were not involved in security issues. Then very quickly they left me and went to fight because they were being attacked by Force 17. Me and Mohammed were kept separate. At about 4 or 5 pm I heard screaming and the Hamas group came back to me and told me that Mohammed had fallen off the roof. They gave me water and allowed me to wash and pray. In the meantime some of my relatives had been alerted and there was intervention and someone came to get me and I was allowed to leave. Mohammed’s body was found in the street below the building; his hands were tied and he was blindfolded. He was 26 years old; he was married but did not yet have children."

As the news of Mohammed Swerki’s death spread it was rumoured that he had been thrown off the roof by Hamas gunmen, and masked Fatah gunmen quickly surrounded the home of Dr Ala’ al-Rifati, dean of the business faculty at the Islamic University in Gaza City and abducted his brother, Mohammed al-Rifati, a 35-year-old imam and reported Hamas supporter. He was later found dead, his body riddled with bullets, near the PA security compound in the Ansar area of Gaza City.

Later that evening masked gunmen abducted Husam Abu Qinas when he was in a shared taxi returning home from work in Khan Yunis. They bundled him into a jeep reportedly belonging to the Presidential Guard/Force 17 and took him to the Mhanna tower (a tall residential building) in Gaza City and threw him off the roof, handcuffed. He had been shot in the head first, but it is not known whether he was still alive when he was thrown from the roof. Husam Abu Qinas, a 35-year-old tiler, married and expecting his first child, was religious but reportedly not a Hamas member. Both attacks were believed to have been carried out in revenge for the killing of Mohammed Swerki.

Gun battles lasting hours took place in residential neighbourhoods around the houses of leading figures of the al-Aqsa Brigades, PA security services and Fatah. The reckless use of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), rockets and other heavy weapons gravely endangered the safety of residents and passers by. Some of those involved in the fighting who were captured were summarily killed when they were hors de combat – including in and around hospitals. Others not involved in the fighting were abducted and deliberately killed while being held hostage.

Testimony of a relative of Jamal Abu Jedian (Abu Maher), the 52-year-old Secretary-General of Fatah in the north of Gaza, a colonel in the Presidential Guard/Force 17 and leading commander of the al-Aqsa Brigades in the north of Gaza and a close associate of Muhammad Dahlan, the former head of the Preventive Security and President Abbas’ strong man in the Gaza Strip:

"At about 4pm on 11 June Hamas gunmen besieged our house; there are six apartments in the house and some 50 people live here; many women and children. They took over the house diagonally opposite and used it to attack our house. They launched RPGs and rockets, which caused all this destruction and fire. Jamal was injured in the face by the explosion of a rocket and other relatives and bodyguards were also injured. We managed to get out from the back to go to the Kamal ‘Adwan hospital, nearby. When we reached the hospital Hamas gunmen attacked us there. They shot Abu Maher many times in the head.(47) Then they took 10 relatives and bodyguards [all young men] outside, near the hospital and shot them all in the legs. Two of them, Shadi Ahmed and Bassam Abu Ruqbeh, had both legs amputated; Samed Abu Jedian and Ala’ Odeh had to have one leg amputated; others sustained fractures as the shooting was at close range."

A Hamas gunman was also killed and tens of people, including two women, were reported to have been injured during the battle around Jamal Abu Jedian’s house.

On the afternoon of the same day, 11 June, armed clashes broke out between members of Hamas’ Executive Force and members of the al-Masri clan, a well-armed clan that has been involved in bloody family feuds for many years. The clan is headed by the Head of the Mukhabarat (General Intelligence) in the Gaza Strip. The clashes took place at the family compound in Beit Hanoun, in the north of the Gaza Strip. After the killing of one of their members in the clashes, Executive Force members chased members of the al-Masri clan and caught up with them at Beit Hanoun hospital.

Testimony of F A, aged 24, mother of five young children:

"There was shooting outside the hospital and then Hamas gunmen went inside the hospital looking for my relatives. They took ‘Id, a father of 20, his son Brahim, aged 21, and his nephew Faraj, aged 22, to a separate room and shot them dead; they shot them in the head and chest. When the gunmen shot and threw grenades outside the hospital my cousin Taghreed [aged 17 and in her second year at high school] was seriously injured in the hip and lower back. She may remain disabled from her injury. When I found Faraj and saw that he had been shot dead I ran after the gunmen, I screamed at them and one of them kicked me. I picked up a stone to throw at him and he shot at me; I was injured in the stomach; I am recovering now but it will take some time."

Children and bystanders caught in the crossfire

During the clashes several bystanders, including children, were killed or injured in the crossfire. Shahed Thamer Miqdad, a child aged 18 months, and her aunt, Nida’ Ahmad Miqdad, 22, were seriously wounded on two consecutive days in their fourth-floor apartment in the Maggousi housing project in Gaza City as reckless armed clashes took place around the house of a Fatah spokesman, Maher Miqdad, between Hamas and Fatah gunmen.

Testimony of Shahed’s grandmother:

"On 13 June at about 6pm Shahed was in this room with her mother; they were sitting down; then Shahed asked her mother for something sweet [habba] and her mother got up to get a sweet from the cupboard, while Shahed was standing in the middle of the room. At that point a bullet came through the window and hit Shahed in the head. The bullet hit her by her left eye and exited at the back of her head. She lost her left eye and is still in a serious condition. She still does not speak or move; we don’t know if she will survive. The following morning at 9am Nida’ was in the same room and a bullet came through the same window and hit her in the lower back. She is now recovering."

It is not clear whether the bullets that injured Shahed and Nida’ were stray bullets from the clashes or whether the apartment was deliberately targeted, possibly by mistake or because other family members worked in the security forces.

Many students risked their lives to take key exams that began on 11 June, passing through checkpoints erected by gunmen and areas where armed clashes were taking place. For some, the journey cost them their lives.

Testimony of a relative of ‘Aisha Maher Al-Shawwa, aged 17:

"‘Aisha was on her way to school in a minibus; she was in her last year of secondary school and always had very high marks and school was very important for her. That morning she was scared but she did not want to miss her exams; and she went. The minibus was in the area near the Rasha al-Shawa centre (in Gaza City) and when it reached the corner of the Abu Qas Supermarket two Qassam members on the corner told the driver to take care because there were snipers from the Preventive Security and the National Security on the Soussi building on Thalatini Street. As soon as the minibus turned a bullet came through the window from high above and hit ‘Aisha in the back, travelling down and damaging vital internal organs. All the information we have obtained shows that the bullet was fired from the top of the Soussi building, where a squad of the Preventive Security and some of their colleagues from the National Security had taken position."

Musa Ahmad Abu ‘Oda, aged nine, was fatally wounded by shrapnel from a rocket that exploded in the street near his house on 13 June. His 12-year-old sister, Khouloud, was injured in the left leg. The two children had taken advantage of a lull in the clashes to go out to buy sweets. Another passer by, 20-year-old Ra’ed Muhammad Abu ‘Obeid, was also killed and 13-year-old Mahmoud Mousa al-Sisi was injured in the legs. According to the families of the three victims, the rocket had been fired from the Mukhabarat centre and was aimed at a jeep belonging to the Executive Force, but the car turned a corner and the rocket exploded in the street. According to other sources, the rocket was more likely to have been fired by Hamas militants at the Mukhabarat centre, and the stray bullet that killed ‘Aisha Maher al-Shawwa could just as likely have been fired by Hamas gunmen. In these, as in many other cases, the reckless conduct of both sides ended in tragedy for uninvolved bystanders.

Peaceful demonstrators under fire

A peaceful march against the Fatah-Hamas confrontation, calling on both sides to stop the fighting, came under fire on the morning of 13 June in Gaza City. Amnesty International has been unable to establish whether the demonstrators were deliberately targeted or, rathe

Embargo Date: 24 October 2007 00:01 GMTInterfactional fighting between Hamas and Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip earlier this year left 350 Palestinians dead and has been followed by further serious abuses in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Amnesty International said in a new report published today.

The 57-page report, Occupied Palestinian Territories: Torn apart by factional strife, accuses Hamas of resorting increasingly to arbitrary detentions and torture since it took power last June in the Gaza Strip, and of allowing its forces to attack and assault peaceful demonstrators as well as journalists reporting on their protests. In the West Bank, the report blames security forces loyal to Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas of arbitrarily detaining hundreds of Hamas supporters but of failing to take action against Fatah militants responsible for abductions, arson and other attacks.

"The leaders of both the PA and Hamas must take immediate steps to break the cycle of impunity that continues to fuel abuses, including arbitrary detentions, abductions, torture and ill-treatment by their forces," said Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International's Middle East Programme Director. "The ongoing factional struggle between Fatah and Hamas is having a dire effect on the lives of Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, compounding and exacerbating the human rights and humanitarian crisis caused by Israeli military campaigns and blockades."

The report calls for the establishment of an independent commission of experts to investigate human rights abuses committed by both parties since the beginning of 2006 and for the leaders on both sides to commit to implementing its recommendations.

According to the report, Palestinian interfactional fighting in the Gaza Strip reached unprecedented levels during the past year, culminating in June 2007 when Hamas seized control of Palestinian Authority security institutions in the territory. It argues that both PA and Hamas security forces and armed groups displayed a flagrant disregard for the safety of the civilian population by launching indiscriminate attacks and reckless gun battles in residential neighbourhoods. This left civilians virtually trapped like prisoners in their own homes while dozens of unarmed bystanders who were not involved in the confrontations, including children, were caught in the line of fire.

The report contains harrowing accounts from victims of both sides and from residents who were directly affected by the waves of armed clashes which took place in the Gaza Strip in June and previous months: “For three days we could not leave the house. Gunmen had taken position on tall buildings and were firing rockets at each others. We feared that a missile could come through the window any time,” a resident of Gaza City told Amnesty International in June 2007.

Rival security forces whose responsibility it was to uphold and enforce the law, and to protect the population, betrayed this responsibility and instead acted as partisans, in concert with armed groups that serve as their proxy militias, and themselves broke the laws and committed gross abuses with complete impunity.

President Abbas’ decision to suspend the operations of PA security forces and judicial institutions in the Gaza Strip following the de-facto takeover of Hamas in Gaza has created a legal and institutional vacuum. This paved the way for Hamas to establish a parallel security and law enforcement apparatus - but one which lacks appropriately trained personnel, accountability mechanisms or safeguards.

As a result, arbitrary detentions and torture of detainees by Hamas forces are now widespread in Gaza, as are attacks against demonstrators and journalists covering such incidents. The initial improvements in the security situation which followed Hamas' takeover in Gaza are fast being eroded .

In the West Bank, human rights abuses by PA security forces are also rife, though much less well publicised - as the international community is seemingly unwilling to rock the boat ahead of forthcoming US-convened conference aimed at resuscitating the long-stalled peace talks between the Israeli government and the PA emergency government.

Hundreds of Hamas supporters or presumed sympathizers have been arrested and arbitrarily detained by PA security forces, violations of legal detention procedures are routine and reports of torture or other ill-treatment are becoming more frequent. Detainees are held in sites not authorized by law for this purpose and security forces frequently ignore orders the judges’ orders to release detainees for lack of evidence.

The PA emergency government has failed to hold to account Fatah gunmen who abducted Hamas supporters and burned down their houses, businesses and charity organizations suspected of links to Hamas in the West Bank - even though the perpetrators of these attacks were often known in their communities and acted in full view of the security forces.

The arrest and detention of more than 1,000 presumed Hamas supporters, most of whom are not accused of any crime, stands in stark contrast to the PA's failure to arrest and bring to justice members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Fatah’s armed wing, responsible for unlawful killings, hostage-taking, arson and other attacks against people and property.

"The lawlessness which has increasingly gripped the West Bank and Gaza Strip in recent years, culminating in the recent interfactional fighting, is to a large extent the result of the prolonged and systematic failure of the PA to uphold and enforce the law," said Malcolm Smart.

The report also calls on the international community to cease the sale or transfer of weapons to any parties until guarantees can be secured that they won't be used to violate human rights.

"The international community must hold all Palestinian parties accountable to the same human rights standards," said Malcolm Smart. "It must ensure that the population of the Gaza Strip is not punished for the positions and actions of the Hamas de-facto administration and that emergency assistance essential to fulfilling fundamental human rights is never used as a bargaining tool to further political goals."

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Hundreds killed in Gaza Strip violence

Hundreds of Palestinians lost their lives as a result of the inter-factional political violence that engulfed the Gaza Strip in the past year. Fighting between security forces and armed groups loyal to the two main Palestinian political parties caused the deaths of many unarmed bystanders not involved in the confrontations, including children.

Both sides -- Fatah, headed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas of then Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh -- committed grave human rights abuses. They showed a flagrant disregard for the human rights of a civilian population already worn down by decades of Israeli occupation, military campaigns and blockades. These have caused a sharp deterioration in the humanitarian situation of the 1.5 million inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.

As armed clashes became more frequent and intensified, Fatah and Hamas gunmen unlawfully killed and maimed captured rivals and hostages. They used indiscriminate and reckless fire in and around residential neighbourhoods.

Neither medical nor educational facilities were immune as they and residential buildings were both attacked and used as firing positions from which to mount attacks. Homes and public properties were damaged and beleaguered residents were virtually imprisoned in their own homes for days by the fighting.

After Hamas’ violent takeover in the Gaza Strip in June, President Abbas’ decision to suspend operations of PA security forces and judicial institutions in the Gaza Strip created a legal and institutional vacuum there. This opened the way for Hamas to establish a parallel security and law enforcement apparatus, but one which lacks appropriately trained personnel, accountability mechanisms or safeguards.

Unsurprisingly, arbitrary detentions and torture or other ill-treatment of detainees by Hamas forces are now widespread and the initial improvements in the security situation that followed Hamas' takeover are fast being eroded.

In the West Bank, there has also been a marked deterioration in the human rights situation under the emergency government set up by President Abbas in June. Arbitrary detention of suspected Hamas supporters by Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces has become routine. Detainees are often subject to torture or other ill-treatment and Fatah gunmen have launched revenge attacks against Hamas supporters and their properties with impunity.

Amnesty International is calling on both the PA and Hamas to take swift and decisive measures to stop and prevent the increasingly widespread human rights abuses committed by those acting under their authority and to put an end to the impunity enjoyed by security forces and armed groups.

The organization is also calling on the international community to hold all the Palestinian parties accountable to the same human rights standards and to ensure that the population of the Gaza Strip is not punished for the positions and actions of the Hamas de-facto administration and that emergency assistance essential to fulfilling fundamental human rights is never used as a bargaining tool to further political goals.

 

Font: amnesty.org

1) Pick your 10 favorite musical artists. List them or elaborate them.
2) Tag the journal "top10bands" so we can have a full tag page of all our lists!
3) Pick 8 more people to do this! Make sure to link them to your original post.

Here we go....


1. GREEN DAY




2. AFI



3. RANCID




4. MILLENCOLIN




5. MODENA CITY RAMBLERS (MCR)



6. SEX PISTOLS



7. AIDEN



8. HIM



9. RAMONES



10. NOMADI

Yeah really! They do WORK!!
really, they work hard! I mean, one is an hairdresser and she wokes up everyday at 7 am, the other one is a commercialist and woke up at 8 am to spent all day in front of a pc.....and I do nothing!
So when they wanna eat a pizza they can't do it in the middle of the week because they do work! Oh well, maybe I can because...I do nothing! I go to university!! Oh yeah!! And I don't know what working means! Right?
That is. Like if I didn't worked two months woaking up everyday at 5 am, digging earth, carrying buckets of mood, walking jumping and sweating my ass. Oh well....it was only for two months and it was for free...so...how can I know how work is?
Shit, I can't even believe this is my best friends behaviour about my life....maybe it's better if I break a bit...I don't really need them this way, and looks like they don't really need me right now.

Have nice work bitch!

Dear Letizia,

This is a public service announcement from Yours Truly!

Toyota wants everyone to think they are green -- but behind the
scenes, they are working against progress.

More than a million people bought a Prius hybrid from Toyota
because they want to do the right thing for our planet. Hybrid
cars are great because they can go many more miles on a gallon
of gas than a regular car can, so they put out less of the
pollution that is causing global warming.

Right now, Congress is working on a bill that could get car
companies to manufacture cars that are more like the Prius, cars
that can go an average of at least 35 miles on every gallon of
gas. This would be the first improvement in U.S. fuel economy
standards in almost 20 years, and it would save America 1.2
million barrels of oil every day. That is more oil than we
import from Saudi Arabia.

But now Toyota is copping out. It's hard to believe, but the
company that makes the Prius and other super-efficient hybrids
is trying to stop Congress from taking the strongest possible
action to make cars more efficient.

Go to
http://www.nrdconline.org/campaign/greenday_globalwarming_toyota
and tell Toyota to stop lobbying against the 35 miles per gallon
by 2020 standard!

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers -- the powerful
lobbying group that Toyota is an active member of -- is saying
the goal of making cars by 2020 that get an average of 35 miles
per gallon is "unattainable." That makes no sense, since Toyota
is making the Prius, which gets almost 50 miles per gallon,
right now!

Toyota advertises itself as the greenest car company. That
company needs to walk the walk. Go to
http://www.nrdconline.org/campaign/greenday_globalwarming_toyota
now. Tell Toyota to stop fighting progress and start fighting
global warming!

Thanks for taking action to reduce America's dangerous
dependence on oil.

Yours truly,

Billie Joe Armstrong
Green Day + NRDC

P.S. If you or your family own a Toyota hybrid or are thinking
about buying one, please say that in your online message to
Toyota.

I'm fuckin' tanned!!
I'm the hell of a tanned girl with white hands....yeah....white hands....because I must wear leater work gloves....fuck!! Now I got stripes on my skin!!
Anyway, things are goin' very well here, we finally have our punic and phoenician pottery and our punic strate to excave....it's funny.
Yesterday I went in Cagliari to visit the National Archeological Museum, where all the things that our teacher found in years are served....it was funny because we finally saw what he told us about something like 293087490273894728973 times a day!!
The teacher is really a good person and now I do admire him more than ever, because I met some more teachers of this area and I can really say they are complete assholes.
I'm fine, but still missing home and still trying not to tan that much...or to tan my hands!!

Love, Tessa.

(thanks to everyone that added me in these days)

 

Hi friends!!
I miss you all and I miss all our conversations!
I'm locked here in Sardinia for another week and half, so.....blaaaaaa....I wanna go HOME!!
I mean, I can't really be alone on my own for more than 30 minutes here! We are in 10 in an house with only two bathrooms!!! (yeah! Again!).
Anyway, the site is wonderful, really, I promise I'll post tons of pics of it! We come to escavations before the dawn so we can watch the sun goin' up, and then sometime we watch it goin' down. We have sea on three sides of the site so when you stand up on the "high place of Tanit" (that is where we work) you can watch all the sea around you!! It's really amazing!
Then, it's fuckin' hot here and we are burning!! And plus of it, we are surrounded by tourists taking pics of us while we work.....so it's like I'm on the photo album of every single tourist that came to Nora in these days!!
Uhm...what else? Uhm.....Uhm.....Oh well...for what it matter: I'm the first that found late phoenician pottery on our site!! Muah ah ah ah *dances around happily*

Love, Hugs, Kisses

Tessa.